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ABSTRACT: The aim of this research is to clarify the legal framework under which the ECB applies its 
conditionality policy, by making a distinction between implicit and explicit conditionality. In the first 
years of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB resorted to an implicit form of conditionality, driving Eu-
ro area Member States towards acceptance of an economic adjustment programme or the adop-
tion of significant economic, fiscal and structural reforms. Implicit conditionality has been applied 
in the context of the ECB’s collateral policy, to the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA), to the purchase of sovereign bonds under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), as well 
as to the transfer of profits deriving from these purchases (the so-called SMP profits). Eventually, 
the ECB decided to shift to explicit conditionality. Under the Outright Monetary Transactions pro-
gramme (OMT) and the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), sovereign bonds purchases be-
came subject to compliance with the EU/IMF strict and effective conditionality. The temporary 
framework for collateral eligibility was modified following the same approach. While the shift to 
explicit conditionality has to be welcomed, it does not lessen concerns about the ECB’s democratic 
accountability and its interference in domestic reform processes. Some regards the ECB’s condi-
tionality as a true political action departing from the standards of neutrality and independence 
that central banks should meet. This paper describes the set of policy instruments through which 
conditionality has been applied, with a view to assess the legitimacy of the ECB’s actions. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2012, at the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis, the President of the Europe-
an Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi pledged that: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready 
to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough”.1 
This paper aims at analysing the meaning of the ECB’s commitment to do “whatever 
it takes” (probably the three most effective words in the history of central banking), fo-
cussing in particular on the evolution of the ECB’s conditionality policy and its tools.  
During the crisis, assistance to countries in distress was often provided by the ECB 
on the condition that EU/IMF financial assistance was requested or comprehensive 
structural reforms adopted.  
The depth of the ECB’s interference in the domestic policy-making of weak Euro ar-
ea members was justified in terms of raison d’euro: the need to safeguard the EMU and 
its stability – perceived as a supreme good – made extreme measures not only neces-
sary, but almost inevitable. 
Although technocratic in nature, the ECB exerted its power not only to protect the 
integrity of its monetary policy, but also to achieve clearly political goals. 
Even if it has to be acknowledged that central banks inevitably inhabit a world of pol-
icy, where the law plays a rather limited role,2 the issue deserves careful consideration, 
especially for the legal and democratic accountability concerns it raises. 
II. The ECB’s conditionality in context 
Since the 1970s, a substantial body of literature has developed on the subject of condi-
tionality. Political science and legal studies have focussed on conditionality applied by 
States (the USA in particular) or international organizations (the European Union, the 
IMF and the World Bank) to influence the behaviour of other countries through various 
incentive instruments. 
Initially, conditionality was mainly applied in the fields of trade and development 
cooperation and by international financial institutions when providing their financial as-
sistance. Over the years, due to its effectiveness, the scope of conditionality expanded 
to other external policy sectors like international investments, foreign affairs and securi-
ty, environment and energy. Moreover, it was used to achieve a broader set of objec-
tives including human rights protection, democracy, good governance, and the intro-
duction of labour and environmental standards. 
 
1 Speech by M. DRAGHI, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in 
London, 26 July 2012, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
2 R.M. LASTRA, International Financial and Monetary Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, para. 
2.01. 
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Academics have sought to identify the many types of conditionality instruments and 
incentive mechanisms, which were classified in: negative and positive, ex ante and ex 
post conditionality.3 
Negative conditionality was first defined by Stokke while studying the development 
policy of the USA during the post-Cold War period as “the use of pressure, by the donor 
government, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reduc-
ing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient”.4 Negative conditionality was later as-
sociated with the use of sanctions in a number of policy areas. 
Positive conditionality, instead, can be described as a mechanism to induce in the 
addressee a voluntary behaviour that fulfils a set of conditions, in return for benefits or 
rewards (in terms of aid, preferential treatment or access). 
When conditionality is applied ex ante, conditions are used as a leverage and have 
to be fulfilled by the addressee before the promised benefits can be enjoyed.  
On the contrary, ex post conditionality applies to on-going institutionalised relation-
ships, and the recipient has to stay compliant with pre-set conditions in order to contin-
ue receiving the benefits which would otherwise be reduced, suspended or cancelled. 
The EU conditionality policy has been studied extensively especially in the field of 
the external relations. In this context, the EU has always been treated as a single actor, 
taking into account only the final outcome and ignoring the different views expressed 
by its institutions or the inter-institutional debate.  
More recently, scholars have turned their attention to the austerity measures to 
which the provision of EU/IMF financial assistance is conditioned. Thus, the focus has 
shifted from EU outward conditionality, concerning third States, to EU internal condi-
tionality, applied to its members. 
With this research, we wish to contribute to the debate by analysing the condition-
ality policy of the ECB, one of the EU institutions which is also a member of the so-called 
Troika together with the European Commission and the IMF. 
Notably, for the first time, a central bank used its monetary policy powers as in-
struments of conditionality. 
 
3 As a reference, also for a detailed bibliography, see S. KOCH, A Typology of Political Conditionality Be-
yond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union, in World Development, 2015, pp. 
97-108. According to the Author (at pp. 101-102), the traditional types of conditionality form a matrix and 
can be combined in four different configurations: ex-ante/positive, ex-post/positive, ex-ante/negative and 
ex-post/negative conditionality, the former and the latter being the most frequently used. Ex-ante/positive 
conditionality refers to the fact that a set of pre-defined conditions has to be met by the addressee be-
fore benefits can be granted. Ex-post/negative conditionality applies in pre-established relationships and 
makes the continuous access to benefits dependent on the recipient’s level of performance; in this case, 
benefits are terminated, suspended or withdrawn should the recipient no longer implement pre-set con-
ditions. 
4 O. STOKKE, Aid and Political Conditionality, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p. 12. 
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We contend that the ECB’s conditionality policy presents many distinctive features. 
It is directed to Euro area members and thus it is aimed internally. It pursues institu-
tion-specific goals, even if for the benefit of the whole Euro area and it shows the ECB’s 
strong commitment to preserve the euro. Furthermore, alongside the traditional nega-
tive/positive and ex ante/ex post instruments, the ECB applied its incentive mechanisms 
in an implicit and explicit way. 
Implicit conditionality entails a tacit understanding of benefits and sanctions, out-
side the confines of written law, and it is based on a clear power asymmetry. 
According to Stefano Sacchi,  
“Although instances of conditionality are usually embodied in formalized agreements, and 
their terms – including the sanctions for non-compliance – explicitly specified through de-
tailed covenants, […] this is not necessary for conditionality to be operational and effec-
tive in influencing a party’s behaviour. Conditionality can be based on an implicit under-
standing between the two parties involved that a particular behaviour is expected in or-
der for the good to be made available, even in the absence of detailed covenants”.5 
While it is widespread in the realm of international relations, recourse to implicit 
conditionality is rather uncommon for a supranational institution. In fact, conditionality 
is usually applied by international organizations in the exercise of their conferred pow-
ers and its terms are explicitly established in binding legal provisions.  
At the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB applied this form of condi-
tionality in the context of its collateral policy, the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
and the Securities Markets Programme (SMP).  
In these instances, the Central Bank made (large) use of its discretionary monetary 
powers, formally pursuing risk-mitigating objectives, in order to safeguard the EMU and 
its stability. However, well beyond that, the ECB’s conditionality contributed to drive Eu-
ro area crisis countries to adopt urgent and crucial reforms or even to seek EU/IMF fi-
nancial assistance. 
Unlike in the case of conditionality attached to EU/IMF lending, which has clear legal 
bases6 and is defined in Memoranda of Understanding and EU Council Decisions (and, 
 
5 S. SACCHI, Conditionality by Other Means: EU Involvement in Italy’s Structural Reforms in the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis, in Comparative European Politics, 2015, pp. 77-92, at p. 78. 
6 The legal bases for conditionality attached to the Euro Area intergovernmental loans to Greece (the 
so-called Greek Loan Facility) are to be found in TFEU Arts 126 and 136. In the case of the European Fi-
nancial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), conditionality is based on Art. 3 of Council Regulation (EU) 
407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism. In 2011, a third par-
agraph was added to TFEU Art. 136 through the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25 March 
2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a sta-
bility mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro adding; according to the new para. 3 of 
Art. 136 TFEU: “The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made sub-
ject to strict conditionality”. Accordingly, Art. 13 of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) establishes 
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in the case of the IMF, in Letters of Intent and Stand-By Arrangements), no legal docu-
ment formalises the scope of the ECB’s implicit conditionality.  
Instead, pressure on governments in distress was exerted by the ECB through press 
releases and letters which were supposed to remain confidential. Market mechanisms 
further contributed to make the ECB’s interventions effective. 
Eventually, the ECB decided to shift to explicit conditionality. 
Under the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT), announced in Sep-
tember 2012 but never implemented, sovereign bonds purchases were subject to the 
“strict and effective conditionality” attached to a European Financial Stability Facili-
ty/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. The 2014 review of the tem-
porary framework on collateral eligibility established that debt instruments issued by 
countries under an EU/IMF macro-economic adjustment programme could be accepted 
as collateral as long as they complied with the attached conditionality. More recently, 
under the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the purchase of bonds issued by 
Euro area countries receiving EU/IMF financial assistance was conditioned to a positive 
outcome of the programme review. 
In doing so, the ECB demonstrated its ability to respond to context. One might ar-
gue that, being the reform of the EU economic governance under the close scrutiny of 
the European Court of Justice (and of the German Federal Constitutional Court),7 the 
ECB adapted its policy to the evolving legal situation. 
Explicit conditionality strengthens legal certainty and predictability. Providing it with 
a clear legal basis in ECB legal acts, conditionality becomes applicable to Euro area 
members according to standard criteria, thus reducing discretionality and avoiding se-
lectivity. The whole process is made more transparent and open to judicial review. 
The shift to explicit conditionality has therefore to be welcomed, even if it does not 
lessen concerns about the ECB’s democratic accountability and its interference in do-
mestic reform processes.8 Moreover, it does not address the several controversial is-
 
the procedure to define the conditions attached to financial assistance. See also Art. 2 of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Framework Agreement. 
7 Reference is made to the claims that led to German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of the 
of 12 September 2012, BvR 1390/12 et al., on the ESM and on the so-called Fiscal Compact, to the Court of 
Justice, judgment of 27 November 2012, case C-370/12, Pringle, and to the Court of Justice, judgment of 16 
June 2015, case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v. Deutscher Bundestag adopted following a preliminary ruling re-
quest from the German Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014, BvR 
2728/13 et al.  
8 On the ECB’s democratic accountability see in particular G. CLAEYS, M. HALLERBERG, O. TSCHEKASSIN, Eu-
ropean Central Bank Accountability: How the Monetary Dialogue could Evolve, in Bruegel Policy Contribution, 
March 2014; F. SCHARPF, Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Disabling of Democratic accountability, in A. 
SCHÄFER, W. STREECK, Politics in the Age of Austerity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 108 et 
seq.; F. AMTENBRINK, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
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sues arising from the ECB’s participation in the Troika and from the content of the 
EU/IMF adjustment programmes.9 
The following paragraphs will analyse the scope of the ECB’s conditionality, describ-
ing the set of policy instruments through which it has been applied and with a view to 
assess the legitimacy of the ECB’s actions. 
III. Conditionality applied to collateral eligibility for Eurosystem 
credit operations 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, central banks have been at the forefront of efforts 
to prevent economic collapse, providing liquidity to the financial system and to solvent 
individual banks experiencing funding difficulties.  
As the crisis unfolded, the ECB engaged in “non-standard” (or unconventional) 
monetary policy measures, which deviate from traditional monetary policy operations 
and are of a temporary nature. 
One of the ECB’s non-standard measures was aimed at improving banks’ funding 
and liquidity conditions.10 To this end, the collateral framework was changed to broad-
en the list of eligible assets against which counterparties may obtain liquidity in central 
bank refinancing operations. 
 
Besides, it has to be noted that the ECB Governing Council – which includes the members of the Ex-
ecutive Board and the central bank governors of euro area Member States – decides on a one member, 
one vote basis, but a voting rights rotation system has been in place since January 2015. According to Art. 
10, para. 2, of the ESCB Statute, until the total number of Governors exceeded 18, Executive Board mem-
bers hold permanent voting rights; instead, euro area countries are assigned to two groups, which exer-
cise their voting rights with different frequencies, according to their capital share in the ECB and the size 
of GDP and the financial sector. To determine group membership, a ranking was established. Governors 
from the first five countries – currently, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands – share four 
voting rights. All others (14 since Lithuania joined on 1 January 2015) share 11 voting rights. The Gover-
nors take turns using the rights on a monthly rotation. As a result, Governors from the five largest euro 
area economies may vote 80 per cent of times, with participation of other Governors significantly lower 
(see S. LEVASSEUR, Rotation of Voting on the ECB Governing Council: More than Symbolic?, in ofce le blog. The 
Collective Blog of the French Economic Observatory, 15 January 2015, www.ofce.sciences-po.fr. In response 
to criticism raised by the European Parliament, the ECB underlined that decisions are traditionally adopt-
ed by consensus (see European Parliament Legislative resolution P5_TA(2003)0094 of 13 March 2003 on 
the recommendation of the ECB for a proposal for a Council decision on an amendment to Art. 10.2 of 
the ESCB Statute. The minutes of the Governing Council monetary policy meetings, that the ECB started 
to publish only in January 2015, do not include details of discussions. 
9 While monetary policy decisions (such as decisions on collateral, ELA ceilings, SMPs, OMTs and the 
PSPP) falls within the mandate of the Governing Council, participation in the Troika is managed directly by 
the Executive Board. 
10 The ECB’s standard monetary policy tools are: open market and credit operations, standing facili-
ties and minimum reserves requirements for credit institutions. 
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According to Art. 18, para. 1, of the ESCB Statute,11 the ECB and Euro area national 
central banks (NCBs) can operate in financial markets and provide credit to counterpar-
ties only against adequate collateral.  
The assumption is that central banks should only lend against high quality collat-
eral. Collateral requirements are conceived to mitigate credit risk, ensure equal treat-
ment of counterparties and enhance operational efficiency and transparency. Haircuts 
are applied to the market value of the collateral being pledged. 
Criteria to determine assets adequacy, as well as entities that may act as counter-
parties in credit operations, are established by two sets of provisions: the ECB General 
and Temporary Frameworks. 
The General Framework consists of decisions and guidelines12 adopted by the ECB 
Governing Council and it establishes the monetary policy tools, operations, instruments 
and procedures of the Eurosystem. Its cornerstone is ECB Guideline 2015/510,13 which in 
its Part Four defines uniform eligibility criteria for assets that may be employed as collat-
eral in Eurosystem credit operations, differentiating by type of asset type and its risk.14  
The Temporary Framework complements, amends or overrules the General 
Framework. It allows the ECB to adopt additional derogatory measures that may be-
come necessary under exceptional circumstances and are applicable until further no-
tice. The two frameworks co-exist and the requirements of one framework do not over-
ride the other unless otherwise specified. This provides the ECB with sufficient flexibility 
to respond to market conditions and regulatory developments. 
During the financial crisis, the ECB broadened the range of acceptable collateral 
through the Temporary Framework, thus allowing departures from the general eligibil-
 
11 Protocol no. 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB (the ESCB 
Statute), p. 230. 
12 The ECB Guidelines are binding legal acts addressed to the euro area NCBs only. They are not in-
tended to directly or individually affect the rights of counterparties. “They are the tools with which the 
ECB can ensure the integration of the NCBs into the System and concern the power of the ECB to ensure 
compliance by the NCBs with decisions taken centrally” (R. SMITS, The European Central Bank: Institutional 
Aspects, The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1997, p. 104). See also S. ANTONIAZZI, La Banca centrale europea tra politica 
monetaria e vigilanza, Torino: Giappichelli, 2013, p. 114; A. MALATESTA, La Banca centrale europea, Milano: 
Giuffrè, 2003, p. 135 et seq. 
13 Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the ECB of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the Eurosys-
tem monetary policy framework (ECB/2014/60), p. 3, as lastly revised and amended (see ECB Monetary 
Policy instruments, General Framework, www.ecb.europa.eu). 
14 One of the eligibility criteria consists in meeting the high credit quality requirements specified in 
the Eurosystem credit assessment framework (ECAF). On the basis of the General Framework, the ECB 
publishes on its website a single list of collateral, specifying on a daily basis which assets may be used in 
liquidity-providing operations. 
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ity criteria. This was necessary to avoid a credit crunch and to guarantee the availability 
of sufficient bank liquidity in countries struck by the crisis.15 
Notably, debt instruments issued or guaranteed by Euro area members in distress 
were either accepted through a waiver to the general criteria or rejected, depending on 
the ECB’s risk assessment. In spite of their downgrading by credit rating agencies, sov-
ereign bonds of these countries were considered eligible as collateral, provided that 
they complied with EU/IMF adjustment programmes. Greater haircuts compensated the 
consequent increase in risk. 
Decisions on collateral eligibility were taken by the ECB in the exercise of its power 
to limit risks for the Eurosystem.16 In fact, according to ECB Guideline 2015/510, the 
Governing Council has the right to determine whether an issue, issuer, debtor or guar-
antor fulfils the Eurosystem credit quality requirements relying on any information it 
deems relevant for ensuring adequate risk protection (Art. 59, para. 6). Moreover, even 
assets eligible for ordinary Eurosystem credit operations may be subject to specific risk 
control measures (Arts 127 and 128).  
Compliance with EU/IMF conditionality was therefore monitored by the ECB to as-
sess the adequacy as collateral of sovereign bonds issued by crisis countries. As a mat-
ter of fact, the ECB formally exercised its risk management discretionary powers. How-
ever, by making collateral eligibility subject to the implementation of EU/IMF adjustment 
programmes, the ECB almost acted as an enforcer of the Troika’s conditionality. 
This stance was applied to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. 
a) On 6th May 2010, following the worsening of the Greek crisis and fearing conta-
gion to other countries, the Eurogroup Member States17 announced they were ready to 
provide financial assistance to Greece together with the IMF.18 
On the same day, the ECB decided to continue accepting Greek sovereign debt de-
bentures as collateral even though their rating had been written down to junk bond 
levels. To this end, for Greek sovereign bonds only, the ECB exceptionally and tempo-
 
15 Guideline 2014/528/EU of the ECB of 9 July 2014 on additional temporary measures relating to Eu-
rosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral and amending Guideline ECB/2007/9 
(ECB/2014/31), p. 28, as amended. 
16 See ECB, The Financial Risk Management of the Eurosystem’s Monetary Policy Operations, July 2015, 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
17 See Statement by the Eurogroup on providing stability support to Greece, 2 May 2010, 
www.consilium.europa.eu, as well as Statement of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 7 May 
2010, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
18 On 2nd May 2010, the Eurogroup agreed to provide 80 billion euros through the so-called Greek 
Loan Facility, a pool of bilateral loans to be managed and disbursed to Greece by the European Commis-
sion along a three-year period. The IMF adopted a Stand-by Arrangement under the Emergency Financing 
Mechanism to lend Greece 30 billion euros (equivalent to 3200 per cent of the country’s quota). See IMF, 
Greece: Request for Stand-By Arrangement, in Country Report n. 10/111, May 2010.  
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rarily suspended the Eurosystem minimum requirements for credit quality thresholds 
(ECB Decision 2010/268/EU).19 
The fourth recital of the ECB Decision 2010/268/EU stated the grounds on which the 
waiver was granted:  
“The Governing Council has assessed the fact that the Greek Government has approved 
an economic and financial adjustment programme which it has negotiated with the Eu-
ropean Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the strong 
commitment of the Greek Government to fully implement such programme. The Gov-
erning Council has also assessed, from a Eurosystem credit risk management perspec-
tive, the effects of such a programme on the securities issued by the Greek Government. 
The Governing Council considers the programme to be appropriate, so that, from a cred-
it risk management perspective, the marketable debt instruments issued by the Greek 
Government or guaranteed by the Greek Government retain a quality standard sufficient 
for their continued eligibility as collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations, ir-
respective of any external credit assessment”.20  
At the same time, the ECB announced that it would monitor the implementation of 
the economic and financial reform programme behind the adoption of the ECB Decision 
2010/268/EU. 
This Decision remained in force until the end of February 2012, when Greece began 
its sovereign debt restructuring by launching a 200 billion euros exchange offer on its 
bonds.21 The so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI) brought further distress to the 
country and, on 27th February 2012, Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s awarded 
Greece a “selective default” rating. In this new context, the ECB considered the PSI im-
pairing the adequacy of Greek sovereign bonds as collateral and therefore repealed its 
previous decision,22 only to reintroduce it shortly after, but with further conditionality 
 
19 Decision ECB/2010/3 of the European Central Bank of 6 May 2010 on temporary measures relating 
to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek Government, p. 102, 
no longer in force. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 The exchange offer did not include Greek sovereign debt instruments held by the ECB, NCBs and 
the EIB in their portfolios. See J. ZETTELMEYER, C. TREBESCH, M. GULATI, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autop-
sy, in Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper, WP 13-8, August 2013, p. 10; J. BLACK, Euro 
Central Banks Said to Swap Greek Investment-Portfolio Bonds, in Bloomberg, 21 February 2012, 
www.bloomberg.com. See also A. VITERBO, I meccanismi per la risoluzione delle crisi del debito sovrano: alla 
ricerca di un difficile bilanciamento tra interessi pubblici e privati, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2014, 
pp. 351-370; A. VITERBO, Supranational Creditors: A Threat to the Equal Status of Bondholders?, in Capital Mar-
kets Law Journal, 2015, pp. 193-211. 
22 Decision 2012/133/EU of the European Central Bank of 27 February 2012 repealing Decision 
ECB/2010/3 on temporary measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or 
guaranteed by the Greek Government (ECB/2012/2), p. 36, no longer in force. 
510 Annamaria Viterbo 
attached (ECB Decision 2012/153/EU).23 A few days later, the Euro area Ministers of Fi-
nance approved the Second economic adjustment programme for Greece.24 
It is worth mentioning that a group of more than 200 Italian bondholders of Greek 
securities requested the annulment of ECB Decision 2012/153/EU before the CJEU. The 
applicants claimed that the additional conditionality required for the acceptance of 
Greek bonds as collateral breached the principles of equal treatment and proportionali-
ty. The CJEU however dismissed the case declaring it inadmissible because the appli-
cants were not directly concerned by the ECB Decision 2012/153/EU.25 
The same group of applicants brought an action before the CJEU for the damage 
they had allegedly suffered from the adoption of ECB Decision 2012/153/EU and from 
other measures related to the Greek sovereign debt restructuring, arguing that the ECB 
had infringed their legitimate expectations, the principle of legal certainty and the prin-
ciple of equal treatment of private creditors.26 The CJEU ruled however that the ECB was 
not responsible for losses borne by private investors in the context of the Greek re-
structuring. 
During 2012, the ECB intervened many other times to urge Greece to implement 
austerity measures. In July, following the general elections, the ECB suspended the ac-
ceptance of Greek securities as collateral until the completion of the first review of the 
second economic adjustment programme.27 Commentators considered this decision as 
a way of stepping up pressure on the new government to confirm adherence to the 
 
23 The waiver was made conditional upon “the provision by the Hellenic Republic to NCBs of a collat-
eral enhancement in form of a buy-back scheme” (Art. 1, para. 1, of the Decision ECB/2012/3 of the Euro-
pean Central Bank of 5 March 2012 on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guar-
anteed by the Hellenic Republic in the context of the Hellenic Republic’s debt exchange offer, p. 19, no 
longer in force). See also the Statements by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area and EU 
institutions, Brussels, of 21 July 2011 and 26 October 2011. On the credit enhancement see A. SÁINZ DE 
VICUÑA, Legal Perspectives on Sovereign Default, in BIS, Sovereign Risk: A World Without Risk Free Assets?, BIS 
Papers No. 72, July 2013, p. 117. 
24 Euro area members and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus 
an additional 130 billion euros for the years 2012-2014. 
25 See Tribunal, order of 25 June 2014, case T-224/12, Alessandro Accorinti et al. v. ECB. It is worth 
mentioning that, unlike ordinary decisions for which the ECB identifies the addressee of the act, decisions 
on collateral are atypical. In fact, although not specifying the addressee, they have an impact on the do-
mestic law system of euro area members: NCBs are authorised to accept or reject as collateral debt in-
struments issued or fully guaranteed by a country in distress, waiving ordinary credit requirements. 
26 See Tribunal, judgment of 7 October 2015, case T-79/13, Alessandro Accorinti et al. v. ECB. See N. 
PIGEON, La Banque centrale européenne n’est pas responsable des pertes subies par les créanciers privés de la 
Grèce dans le cadre du plan de restructuration de la dette publique grecque (Commentaire de Tribunal, arrêt du 
7 octobre 2015, affaire T-79/13, Accorinti et al. c. BCE), in European Papers, 2016, www.europeanpapers.eu, 
pp. 231-243. 
27 See Decision ECB/2012/14 of the European Central Bank of 18 July 2012 repealing Decision 
ECB/2012/3 on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic 
Republic in the context of the Hellenic Republic’s debt exchange offer, p. 26. 
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commitments previously undertaken with the EU/IMF.28 A waiver to the general eligibil-
ity requirements was reinstated once the Eurogroup expressed its positive opinion on 
the reform programme implemented until then by the country.29 
More recently, following the January 2015 legislative elections and announcements 
by the new Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras that his government intended to renegotiate 
the reform programme agreed with the Troika, the ECB once again discontinued ac-
ceptance of Greek securities as collateral.30 The ECB press release of 4th February 2015 
explained that: “The Governing Council decision is based on the fact that it is currently 
not possible to assume a successful conclusion of the programme review and is in line 
with existing Eurosystem rules”.31 Since Greece was no longer compliant with the pro-
gramme, the temporary suspension of ordinary credit quality thresholds could not be 
maintained. As a result of the decision – adopted a few days before a crucial Eurogroup 
meeting – the spread soared,32 most Greek banks suffered severe capitalisation losses 
and their customers rushed to retrieve their money from bank accounts.  
“If the ECB had let the politicians discuss first, and the Eurogroup had concluded that 
Greece is no longer under a programme, then the necessary conditions for the waiver on 
Greek government bonds would have disappeared. The waiver would have anyway 
needed to be cancelled, with the difference that the trigger in that case would have been 
a political decision from the Eurogroup rather than from the ECB. The ECB’s pre-emptive 
move formally protects the central bank’s independence, but it also forces the political 
game of next week, well beyond the limit of a central bank’s remit”.33 
On 18th February 2015, the Athens government requested a six-month extension of 
the adjustment programme. The Eurogroup and the EFSF agreed to four months but, in 
spite of exhausting negotiations, it was impossible to successfully conclude the last re-
 
28 S. SUONINEN, M. JONES, ECB Turns Screw on Greece, Stops Accepting Collateral, in Reuters, 20 July 2012. 
29 See in particular the fourth and fifth recital of the Decision ECB/2012/32 of the European Central 
Bank of 19 December 2012 on temporary measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instru-
ments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic, p. 74, no longer in force. 
30 See in particular the fifth recital of the Decision ECB/2015/6 of the European Central Bank of 10 
February 2015 on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic 
Republic, p. 29: “On the basis of the information available, the Governing Council has made an assess-
ment, according to which it is not currently possible to assume a successful conclusion of the review of 
the European Union/International Monetary Fund programme for the Hellenic Republic. Consequently, 
the Hellenic Republic is no longer deemed to be in compliance with the conditionality of the programme”. 
31 ECB Press Release, Eligibility of Greek Bonds Used as Collateral in Eurosystem Monetary Policy Opera-
tions, 4 February 2015, www.ecb.europa.eu.  
32 J. COX, Greek Stocks and Bonds Sink After ECB Debt Decision, in The Wall Street Journal, 5 February 
2015, www.wsj.com. 
33 S. MERLER, ECB Collateral Damages on Greece, in Bruegel Blog, 5 February 2015, www.bruegel.org. See 
also P. KRUGMAN, A Dance with Draghi, in The New York Times, 5 February 2015, krugman.blogs.nytimes.com 
and Greece and the ECB: The Enforcer. How the European Central Bank can dictate terms to the Greek govern-
ment, in The Economist, 4 February 2015. 
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view of the programme before its expiry on 30th June 2015.34 To avoid bank runs and a 
collapse of the Greek banking system, the government was forced to introduce capital 
controls, limiting transfers outside the country and cash withdrawals. Only on the 14th 
of August, a political agreement was finally reached on a third economic adjustment 
programme.35  
Nonetheless, the ECB’s negative decision on the adequacy of Greek debt securities 
as collateral remained in force for more than a year.36 The waiver was reintroduced on-
ly after the adoption of all prior actions requested under the Memorandum of Under-
standing and the successful conclusion of the first review of the third adjustment pro-
gramme.37 
b) A similar approach was adopted with Ireland (in 2010 and 2011) and with Portu-
gal (in 2011), suspending the eligibility of their debt instruments for Eurosystem mone-
tary policy operations, only to accept them again after the introduction of “appropriate” 
adjustment programmes “agreed” with the Troika. 
Notably, in his letter dated 15th October 2010, the ECB President Jean-Claude 
Trichet reminded the Irish Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan that:  
“The Eurosystem may limit, exclude or suspend counterparties’ access to monetary poli-
cy instruments on the grounds of prudence and may reject or limit the use of assets in 
the Eurosystem credit operations by specific counterparties. The Governing Council in-
deed carefully monitors the Eurosystem credit granted to the banking system, in the 
Irish as well as in all other cases, and in particular the size of Eurosystem exposures to 
individual banks, the financial soundness of these banks, and the collateral they provide 
to the Eurosystem. The assessment by the Governing Council of the appropriateness of 
its exposures to Irish banks depends very much on progress in economic policy adjust-
ment, enhancing financial sector capital and bank restructuring”.38 
Eventually, the ECB Governing Council considered that both the Irish and Portu-
guese debt instruments met sufficient quality standards as collateral, irrespective of any 
external credit assessment, since “the Government [had] approved and [was] in the 
process of implementing an economic and financial adjustment programme, which it 
 
34 Eurogroup, Statement on Greece, 20 February 2015; EFSF Press Release, EFSF Board of Directors ex-
tends the Master Financial Facility Agreement (MFFA) for Greece until 30 June 2015, 27 February 2015. 
35 A new Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 19 August 2015 after the ESM Board of 
Governors approved the Third economic adjustment programme for up to 86 billion euros for the period 
2015-2018. 
36 During this period, the Hellenic banking system was kept afloat by the Emergency Liquidity Assis-
tance provided by the Bank of Greece (see infra para. 3). 
37 See Decision ECB/2016/18 of the European Central Bank of 22 June 2016 on the eligibility of mar-
ketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic and repealing Decision, p. 
14 and ECB Press Release, ECB Reinstates Waiver Affecting the Eligibility of Greek Bonds Used as Collateral in 
Eurosystem Monetary Policy Operations, 22 June 2016. 
38 The so-called Irish letters are published on the ECB website (see infra, para. 3). 
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[had] negotiated with the European Commission, the ECB and the International Mone-
tary Fund, and which [had] committed to fully implement”.39 
c) In the case of Cyprus, after the March 2013 banking crisis and the partial bail-in of 
uninsured deposits, the country launched a one billion euros offer to exchange domes-
tic-law bonds held by residents with new bonds having the same coupon rate but long-
er maturity. During the debt management exercise, Cypriot bonds were no longer ac-
cepted as collateral. Their eligibility was restored only after completion of the exercise 
and confirmation that Cyprus was complying with the conditionality of the economic 
and financial adjustment programme.40 
Eventually, in March 2013, to simplify the collateral framework, the ECB Governing 
Council withdrew its many decisions on assets issued or guaranteed by individual pro-
gramme countries41 and adopted a Guideline addressed to all Euro area members.42  
The new Guideline contained temporary measures on collateral eligibility and marked 
a shift to explicit conditionality. It established the following general principle: debt instru-
ments offered as collateral by Euro area members in distress are exempted from general 
credit quality requirements whenever the issuing or guaranteeing country is implement-
ing a EU/IMF programme. However, it is within the powers of the ECB Governing Council 
to decide whether the Member State “comply with the conditionality of the financial sup-
port and/or the macroeconomic programme” and to revoke the waiver.43  
The ECB Guideline currently in force maintains the same approach.44 
 
39 See the fourth recital of the following two ECB Decisions: Decision ECB/2011/4 of the European 
Central Bank of 31 March 2011 on temporary measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt in-
struments issued or guaranteed by the Irish Government, p. 33, no longer in force; and Decision 
ECB/2011/10 of the European Central Bank of 7 July 2011 on temporary measures relating to the eligibil-
ity of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese Government, p. 31, no longer 
in force. 
40 See Decision ECB/2013/13 of the European Central Bank of 2 May 2013 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Republic of 
Cyprus, p. 26; Decision ECB/2013/21 of 28 June 2013 repealing Decision ECB/2013/13 on temporary 
measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Re-
public of Cyprus, no longer in force. 
41 In March 2013, the ECB decisions concerning the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued 
or guaranteed by Greece, Ireland and Portugal were repealed by the Decision ECB/2013/5 of the Europe-
an Central Bank of 20 March 2013. 
42 Guideline 2013/170/EU of the ECB of 20 March 2013 on additional temporary measures relating to 
Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral and amending Guideline ECB/2007/9 (re-
cast) (ECB/2013/4), p. 23, no longer in force. 
43 Ivi, Art. 7. 
44 See Art. 8, para. 2, of ECB Guideline 2014/528/EU, cit., p. 28, as amended. 
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IV. Conditionality applied to the provision of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance 
During the crisis, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) proved to be of critical im-
portance for the operation of the banking system in crisis countries and was granted in 
many occasions.45 In the case of Ireland, Cyprus and Greece, however, the provision of 
ELA was implicitly conditioned by the ECB to the acceptance of a EU/IMF programme of 
economic adjustment. 
Since 1999, Euro area credit institutions facing temporary liquidity problems can re-
ceive ELA from their NCB, in addition or in place of the assistance provided by the Eu-
rosystem.46 In other words, ELA might be granted by NCBs even to banks which are un-
able to access ordinary Eurosystem refinancing operations, provided that they are oth-
erwise solvent. All risks and costs are only borne by the NCB concerned. 
Compared to ordinary monetary policy operations, ELA is provided against lower-
quality collateral, with larger haircuts usually applied.47 NCBs can autonomously design 
their own ELA framework, including eligibility criteria for collateral and the applicable 
risk control measures. 
In fact, ELA falls within national competence and the legal basis for its disbursement 
is found in domestic law. Nevertheless, according to Art. 14, para. 4, of the ESBC Statute, 
the ECB Governing Council may restrict the performance of NCBs national functions, 
and consequently also of ELA operations, whenever they are deemed to interfere with 
the Eurosystem goals and tasks.48  
 
45 Only in September 2015, the ECB authorized NCBs to disclose ELA figures, “in cases where they 
deem that such communication is necessary”. See ECB Press Release, Communication on Emergency Li-
quidity Assistance, 16 September 2015, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
46 W. BUITER, ELA: An Emperor Without Clothes, in Global Economics View, 21 January 2011, 
www.willembuiter.com. See also K. WHELAN, The ECB’s Collateral Policy and Its Future as Lender of Last Re-
sort, November 2014, www.polcms.europarl.europa.eu. 
47 ELA may amount to State aid if it is not “fully secured by collateral to which appropriate haircuts 
are applied, in function of its quality and market value” (European Commission, Communication on the 
application from 1 August 2013 of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the 
financial crisis, 2013/C 216/01, 30 July 2013). 
48 See ECB, The financial risk management of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations, cit., p. 34: “In-
terference with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB could, for instance, result from the following: (i) a 
threat to the singleness of monetary policy, (ii) a threat to the implementation of monetary policy, for ex-
ample by making the steering of short-term rates more difficult, (iii) a threat to the financial independ-
ence of the NCB, for instance if ELA was not provided against sufficient collateral to safeguard such inde-
pendence, (iv) an obvious concern about a possible breach of the monetary financing prohibition, or (v) 
provision of ELA at overly generous conditions, which, in turn, could increase the risk of moral hazard on 
the side of financial institutions or responsible authorities”. 
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To this end, NCBs have to duly inform the ECB, which may object to the granting of 
ELA.49 Restrictions are approved by the ECB Governing Council by a majority of two 
thirds of the votes cast. 
Upon request of the NCB, the ECB Governing Council may even set a ceiling, refrain-
ing from vetoing ELA operations below a given threshold.  
To avoid moral hazard, ELA cannot be provided to insolvent financial institutions. In 
fact, the purpose of ELA is to address banks’ short-term liquidity problems and not to 
provide solvency support to credit institutions.  
It has to be said though that “the distinction between [solvent but illiquid and insol-
vent institutions] is particularly difficult to make in periods of financial distress, which is 
exactly when central banks may have to use this tool. Consequently, careful judgment is 
necessary in providing emergency liquidity assistance”.50  
When setting ELA ceilings and monitoring NCBs activities in the general interest of 
the Eurosystem, the ECB certainly applies a “careful judgement”. However, for Ireland, 
Cyprus and Greece, this power was also exerted to drive the countries to seek the Troi-
ka’s financial assistance.51 These cases in fact clearly epitomise the impact that a threat 
to veto ELA above a certain threshold may have on a country.  
a) Irish banks, holding low rating assets unsuitable for direct ECB liquidity purposes, 
desperately needed ELA.52 In March 2009, the Central Bank of Ireland provided ELA for 
11.5 billion euros to Anglo Irish Bank, which had been nationalized the previous Janu-
ary, for collateral that could not be pledged in ordinary monetary policy operations. At 
the end of 2010, Anglo Irish Bank owed 28.1 billion euros in ELA.53 Overall, the Eurosys-
 
49 In October 2013, for the first time, the ECB disclosed the ELA Procedures available at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. Below two billion euros, ELA may be granted by the relevant NCB without clearance 
by the ECB Governing Council (non-objection procedure). In practice, however, all ELA requests are com-
municated before disbursement. Timely information should be provided on the reasons for the ELA re-
quest, its beneficiaries, volume and duration, as well as on pledged collateral, its valuation and haircuts 
applied. 
50 Remarks by T. PADOA-SCHIOPPA, Member of the ECB Executive Board, Jakarta, 7 July 2003, 
www.ecb.europa.eu. In 2014, also the European Parliament expressed the view that the solvency concept 
employed by the ECB in the context of ELA is “lacking in transparency and predictability” (European Par-
liament Resolution P7_TA(2014)0239 of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the 
Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries, paras 26 and 94). 
51 See T. BEUKERS, The New ECB and Its Relationship with The Eurozone Member States: Between Central 
Bank Independence and Central Bank Intervention, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, pp. 1579-1620, at 
1593 et seq. 
52 G.B. WOLFF, Eurosystem Collateral Policy and Framework: Was It Unduly Changed?, in Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, November 2014, p. 7. 
53 See K. WHELAN, Briefing Paper on the IBRC, ELA and Promissory Notes, 15 February 2012, prepared for 
the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, p. 3. See also W. BUITER, ELA: 
An Emperor without Clothes?, in CITI Global Economics View, 21 January 2011; B. EICHENGREEN, The Irish Crisis 
and the EU from a Distance, in IMF, Ireland: Lessons from Its Recovery from the Bank-Sovereign Loop, 2015, p. 
109. 
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tem was providing approximately 140 billion euros to Irish banks, around 85 per cent of 
the country’s GDP.54 Ireland was on the verge of a banking crisis, but EU/IMF financial 
assistance had not been requested yet. 
On 15th October 2010, Jean-Claude Trichet, at the time President of the ECB, wrote 
to the Irish Minister of Finance demanding the timely adoption of a reform programme 
in the absence of which the ECB would suspend ELA support. The exchange was sup-
posed to remain strictly confidential, but eventually the so-called Irish letters were pub-
lished on the ECB’s website following receipt of six requests under the public access re-
gime.55 
In his letter, Trichet reminded that ELA was closely monitored by the Governing 
Council to prevent interference with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem. And 
“Therefore, if ELA is provided in significant amounts, the Governing Council will assess 
whether there is a need to impose specific conditions in order to protect the integrity of 
our monetary policy”.56 In addition, to ensure compliance with the monetary financing 
prohibition set forth in Art. 123 TFEU, it was essential to ensure that recipient institu-
tions continued to be solvent. 
Last but not least, Trichet warned that the “large provision of liquidity by the Eu-
rosystem and the Central Bank of Ireland to entities such as Anglo Irish Bank should not 
be taken for granted as a long-term solution. […] the Governing Council cannot commit 
to maintaining the size of its funding to these institutions on a permanent basis”57 and 
concluded that in any decisions concerning liquidity provision to the Irish banking sys-
tem, the ECB would “take into account appropriate progress in the areas of fiscal con-
solidation, structural reforms and financial sector restructuring”.58 
In his reply, the Minister of Finance, Brian Lenihan, assured that the Irish govern-
ment was prepared to adopt any measure to achieve budget sustainability within a four 
years economic strategy.59 
On 16th November 2010, although considered still inadequate, the Eurogroup wel-
comed the reform programme.60 
 
54 See M. DRAGHI, Letter to Mr. Matt Carthy, Member of the European Parliament, Frankfurt: European 
Central Bank, 17 February 2015, which added that “This represented around one-quarter of the ECB’s to-
tal lending at the time – an unprecedented level of exposure to any country, not least in the light of the 
fact that Ireland’s share in the capital of the ECB was about 1%”. 
55 On 6th November 2014, the ECB published on its website the letters exchanged at the end of 2010 
between the former ECB President J.-C. Trichet and the Irish Finance Minister B. Lenihan (including a ded-
icated Q&A). See www.ecb.europa.eu. 
56 Letter of the ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet to the Irish Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan dat-
ed 15 October 2010, published on the ECB’s website. 
57 Ibidem. 
58 Ibidem. 
59 Reply letter of the Irish Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan dated 4 November 2010, published on 
the ECB’s website. 
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In a new letter, the ECB’s President made it clear that:  
“It is the position of the Governing Council that it is only if we receive in writing a com-
mitment from the Irish Government vis-à-vis the Eurosystem on the four following 
points that we can authorise further provision of ELA to Irish financial institutions: 1) The 
Irish government shall send a request for financial support to the Eurogroup; 2) The re-
quest shall include the commitment to undertake decisive actions in the areas of fiscal 
consolidation structural reforms and financial sector restructuring, in agreement with 
the European Commission, the IMF and the ECB; 3) The plan for the restructuring of the 
Irish financial sector shall include the provision of the necessary capital to those Irish 
banks needing it and will be funded by the financial resources provided at the European 
and international level to the Irish government as well as by financial means currently 
available to the Irish government, including existing cash reserves of the Irish govern-
ment; 4) The repayment of the funds provided in the form of ELA shall be fully guaran-
teed by the Irish Government, which would ensure the payment of immediate compen-
sation to the Central Bank of Ireland in the event of missed payments on the side of the 
recipient institutions”.61 
As a result, on 21st November 2010, the Irish government submitted a formal re-
quest for EU/IMF financial assistance, in practice declaring that it was prepared to adopt 
the measures requested by the ECB.62 
On the same day, the Minister Lenihan replied to Trichet stating that:  
“I would like to inform you that the Irish Government has decided today to seek access 
to external support from the European and international support mechanisms. This 
grave and serious decision has been taken in the light of [recent developments] and in-
formed by your recent communications, and the advice you have conveyed to me per-
sonally and courteously in recent days. […] I hope that this will provide some reassur-
ance to the Governing Council and that you will be able to reiterate in a public way the 
continuing practical support of the ECB for the liquidity position of the Irish banks, to 
help reassure the market on this crucial point”.63  
A few days later, the ECB Governing Council approved the disbursement of ELA by 
the Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
60 Eurogroup, Statement on Ireland, 16 November 2010, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
61 Letter of the ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, to the Irish Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan 
dated 19 November 2010 on the large provision of liquidity by the Eurosystem and the Central Bank of 
Ireland to Irish banks and the need for Ireland to agree to an adjustment programme, published on the 
ECB’s website. 
62 See Statement by the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers, 21 November 2010, as well as Statement by 
the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers, 28 November 2010, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
63 Reply letter of the Irish Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan dated 21 November 2010, published on 
the ECB’s website. 
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b) The ECB conditioned ELA also in the case of the Cyprus crisis. In March 2013, as 
the Cypriot Parliament had rejected a number of conditions contained in the EU/IMF 
rescue programme, the ECB Governing Council announced it would soon stop ELA to 
Cypriot banks: “[further] ELA could only be considered if an EU/IMF programme is in 
place that would ensure the solvency of the concerned banks”.64 However, to guarantee 
solvency, banks had to be recapitalised and to do so Cyprus needed financial assis-
tance. As a consequence, Cyprus accepted all the conditions imposed by the Troika65 
and the ECB did not veto an increase in emergency liquidity assistance but continued to 
“monitor the situation closely”.66 
c) For what concerns the Hellenic Republic, in 2015, during the hectic negotiations 
between the newly elected Greek government and the Troika on a four-month exten-
sion of the second adjustment programme, the ECB agreed on a number of increases in 
ELA support.67 At the time, Greek banks heavily relied on ELA. Amid massive deposit 
outflows and a deterioration in the quality of their assets, banks were operating under 
very tight liquidity conditions. The banks-sovereign nexus added further risk to financial 
stability in the country. 
When, on 27th June 2015 – after five Eurogroup meetings in just ten days –, Prime 
Minister Alexis Tsipras submitted the implementation of austerity measures to a refer-
endum, negotiations came suddenly to a halt. The following day, the ECB rejected a re-
quest by the Bank of Greece to increase ELA from 89 to 95 billion euros, while adjusting 
haircuts on collateral.68 The ECB’s decision to cap ELA was followed by the imposition of 
a bank holiday and capital controls to stop withdrawals of savings.69  
The agreement on the third adjustment programme was finally reached in August 
2015. Initially, ELA was maintained at pre-existing levels,70 to be then gradually reduced 
as a consequence of improved liquidity conditions in the Greek banking sector and the 
stabilization of private deposit flows.71 
 
64 ECB Press Release, Governing Council decision on Emergency Liquidity Assistance requested by the Cen-
tral Bank of Cyprus, 21 March 2013, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
65 Eurogroup, Statement on Cyprus, 25 March 2013, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
66 ECB Press Release, ECB’s Reaction to the Agreement on the Cypriot Macroeconomic Adjustment Pro-
gramme, 25 March 2013, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
67 BBC News, ECB Offers Greek Banks Extra €3.3bn Emergency Cash, 19 February 2015, www.bbc.com. 
68 See ECB Press Release, ELA to Greek Banks Maintained, 28 June 2015; G. GEORGIOPOULOS, J. 
O’DONNELL, ECB Rejects Bumper Greek Plea but Existing Support to Stay, 29 June 2015, www.reuters.com. 
69 See President of the Hellenic Republic, Act of Cabinet Having the Effect of Law: Bank Holiday of Short 
Duration (unofficial translation), Act No. 65, 28 June 2015, www.bankofgreece.gr. 
70 See ECB Press Releases, ELA to Greek Banks Maintained, 6 July 2015. 
71 The further reduction of the ELA ceiling for Greek banks at 61 billion euros decided on 22 June 
2016 also reflects the fact that the ECB Governing Council reintroduced the waiver on the eligibility as 
collateral of Greek debt instruments. See ECB Press Release, ECB Reinstates Waiver Affecting the Eligibility of 
Greek Bonds Used as Collateral in Eurosystem Monetary Policy Operations, 22 June 2016 and Bank of Greece 
Press Release, ELA Ceiling for Greek Banks, 23 June 2016. 
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It is worth noting that an annulment procedure has been brought before the CJEU 
to challenge two ECB’s decisions adopted in 2015 to keep the ceiling on ELA support un-
changed despite the requests made by the Bank of Greece.72 The applicant claims to be 
directly and individually concerned, arguing that the ECB acted ultra vires, taking into 
account political considerations in spite of its independence duties and breaching Art. 
14, para. 4, of the ESCB Statute, since an increase in ELA would not interfere with the 
ESCB’s objectives or tasks. The case is still pending at the time of writing. 
V. Conditionality applied to the Securities Markets Programme 
In May 2010, the ECB Governing Council adopted a Decision introducing the Securities 
Markets Programme (SMP) with the aim of restoring an appropriate monetary policy 
transmission and safeguard price stability.73 To this end, the ECB and NCBs were to 
purchase on the secondary market eligible debt instruments issued by central govern-
ments or public entities of the Euro area.  
Purchases of sovereign bonds were to be decided by the Governing Council without 
being explicitly subject to any form of conditionality. However, the fourth recital of the 
SMP Decision pointed out that “The Governing Council has taken note of the statement of 
the Euro area Member State governments that they ‘will take all measures needed to 
meet their fiscal targets this year and the years ahead in line with excessive deficit proce-
dures’ and the precise additional commitments taken by some Euro area Member State 
governments to accelerate fiscal consolidation and ensure the sustainability of their pub-
lic finances”.74 Moreover, SMP purchases were used to put up pressure on some coun-
tries, contributing to their swift adoption of “appropriate” policies and reforms.  
Initially, the SMP was only used to purchase sovereign bonds issued by Greece, Ire-
land and Portugal. However, after being dormant for a few months, the programme 
was reactivated in summer 2011 to include also Italy and Spain.75 
The situation had in fact rapidly worsened, with Italian and Spanish spreads soaring 
to 370 points and market operators starting to believe a request for financial assistance 
was imminent. 
Of no avail was the solemn declaration made on 21st July 2011 by the Euro area 
Heads of State or Government in an attempt to reassure markets that they would “hon-
 
72 ECB’s Decisions of 28 June and 6 July 2015 (see supra). See Court of Justice, case T-368/15, Alcimos 
Consulting SMPC v. ECB, pending. See also www.alcimos.com. 
73 Decision ECB/2010/5 of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities mar-
kets programme, p. 8. 
74 Ibidem. 
75 Purchases under the SMP were made between the 10th May 2010 and 25th March 2011 and be-
tween 4th August 2011 and the end of February 2012. 
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our fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustain-
able fiscal conditions and structural reforms”.76 
Therefore, on 4th August 2011, amid serious financial turbulence, the ECB Govern-
ing Council decided to resort to the SMP buying programme again. However, the first 
purchases – made while Trichet’s press conference was still in progress – disappointed 
markets since they were limited to Irish and Portuguese sovereign bonds.77 
The following day, Trichet wrote to the governments of Italy and Spain.78 While no 
mention to the SMP was made, the timing of the letters was clearly deliberate.79 
In the letter addressed to the Italian government, it was underlined that the 
measures to achieve a balanced budget by 2014 and debt sustainability were deemed 
insufficient. The ECB was venturing into an unexplored territory, dictating detailed 
measures to be timely adopted through decree-laws to be followed by Parliamentary 
ratification in a tight schedule, with the ECB’s implicit conditionality reaching new levels. 
The following excerpt clearly shows the depth of reforms warmly requested to the 
Italian government:  
“At the current juncture, we consider the following measures as essential: […] a) A com-
prehensive, far-reaching and credible reform strategy, including the full liberalisation of 
local public services and of professional services is needed. This should apply particular-
ly to the provision of local services through large scale privatizations. b) There is also a 
need to further reform the collective wage bargaining system allowing firm-level agree-
ments to tailor wages and working conditions to firms’ specific needs and increasing 
their relevance with respect to other layers of negotiations. […]. c) A thorough review of 
the rules regulating the hiring and dismissal of employees should be adopted in conjunc-
tion with the establishment of an unemployment insurance system and a set of active 
labour market policies capable of easing the reallocation of resources towards the more 
competitive firms and sectors”.80 
Mario Monti, who would soon become the new Prime Minister of Italy, commented 
that important domestic policy decisions were being taken by a “market-oriented su-
 
76 See Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area and EU Institutions, Brussels, 21 
July 2011, para. 7, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
77 See Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB and Vitor Constancio, Vice-President of the ECB, In-
troductory Statement to Press Conference with Q&A, 4 August 2011, www.ecb.europa.eu, during which J.-C. 
Trichet declared “I would not be surprised if, before the end of this press conference, you would see 
something in the market”. 
78 The confidential letter from Jean-Claude Trichet to the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi dat-
ed 5 August 2011 was leaked to the press and published by Il Corriere on 29 September 2011 
(www.corriere.it). The letter from Jean-Claude Trichet to the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero dated 5 August 2011 is published in J. ZAPATERO, El Dilema: 600 días de vértigo, Barcelona: Planeta, 
2013, p. 405. 
79 See T. BEUKERS, The New ECB and Its Relationship with The Eurozone Member States, cit., p. 1600. 
80 From: Il Corriere, cit. 
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pranational technical government” and compared the ECB to a “podestà forestiero”, an 
authoritarian figure appointed by the central government that, during the fascist re-
gime, was introduced to replace elected mayors.81 
Similarly, urgent measures were dictated by the ECB in a letter to the Spanish Gov-
ernment. The country was requested to reform its labour legislation, improve public fi-
nance sustainability, restructure and recapitalise the banking sector. The letter con-
cluded that: “Overall, we trust that the Spanish government is aware of its very high re-
sponsibility for the smooth functioning of the Euro area at the current juncture and will 
decisively undertake all necessary measures to regain market confidence in the sus-
tainability of its policies again”.82 
The day after, the governments of both countries promptly replied that they were 
prepared to undertake the reform actions indicated by the ECB.83 Subsequently, Trichet 
released a communiqué welcoming the new course of Italy and Spain, announcing that 
“on the basis of the above assessments, the ECB will actively implement its Securities 
Markets Programme”.84 Sizeable sovereign bonds purchases began the following week, 
with securities acquired under the SMP increasing by 22 billion euros, to reach 96 billion 
euros in total.85 Spread rapidly dropped almost to pre-crisis levels, making a default or 
a financial assistance request only a remote possibility.86 
Even Trichet later admitted the extraordinary character of his letters, but he denied 
their conditional nature: “The letters were of an extraordinary nature. They listed the 
economic, fiscal and structural measures the ECB thought Rome and Madrid had to 
take if they wanted to regain the confidence of investors. […] There were no negotia-
tions between the ECB and the two governments; no promise, no quid pro quo condi-
tions under which the ECB would act. The governments were, of course, free to do 
whatever they deemed appropriate”.87 
VI. Conditionality applied to the transfer of SMP profits to Greece 
At this point of our analysis, a digression concerning the so-called SMP profits is re-
quired. 
 
81 M. MONTI, Il podestà forestiero, in Il Corriere, 7 August 2011. 
82 From: J. ZAPATERO, El Dilema, cit., p. 405. 
83 See in particular S. SACCHI, Conditionality by Other Means, cit., p. 81 et seq. 
84 See Statement by the President of the ECB, 7 August 2011, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
85 Source: www.ecb.europa.eu. 
86 Eventually, in June 2012, Spain requested financial assistance to the European Stability Mechanism 
for the recapitalisation of its financial institutions. 
87 Source: asia.nikkei.com. See also the transcript of the ECB Press Conference of 8 September 2011 
and of 6 October 2011, with Trichet affirming that the letters were to be regarded as messages and the 
ECB was not dictating or imposing anything. 
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The ECB is going to earn huge profits from SMP operations, not only for the differ-
ential between ECB’s funding and the bonds interest rate, but above all because the 
bonds were bought at a discount to par.88 Furthermore, these bonds yield considerable 
interest and are usually held until maturity.89 
At the beginning of 2013, when the ECB Governing Council finally disclosed details 
on SMP holdings, the Eurosystem had securities in portfolio nominally worth 218 billion 
euros, of which 33.9 billion in Greek bonds.90  
A first group of Greek sovereign bonds had already reached maturity by August 
2012. Greece had to repay the ECB three billion euros just few months after the sover-
eign debt restructuring and while still struggling with austerity measures. This was only 
a small fraction of Greek bonds being held by the ECB and NCBs.91 In practice, part of 
the money provided by Euro area members (and the IMF) to Greece had to be used to 
pay back the ECB in a rather circular way.  
Following a storm of criticism,92 the ECB committed to return any profits on its 
Greek bond holdings to its shareholders, in proportion to their capital subscription (i.e. 
both to euro and non-Euro area NCBs, with the latter receiving a smaller percentage).93 
In turns, Euro area Member States undertook to transfer to the Bank of Greece “an 
amount equivalent to the income on the SMP portfolio accruing to their NCBs”.94 These 
 
88 “Through its covered bond and securities market programmes, the ECB acquired €276bn in assets 
between 2009 and 2012, when it was superseded by OMTs. This includes substantial peripheral sovereign 
debt – more than 50 per cent of outstanding Greek debt and a quarter of Portuguese debt – as well as 
commercial paper. As these assets will typically be held to maturity, coupon is the main source of gains 
rather than capital appreciation. Assuming no further defaults, these programmes should generate a net 
gain of around €70bn-€80bn, including €9bn on the Greek debt” (A. UTERMANN, Bailouts Can Turn a Profit 
for Central Banks, in Financial Times, 22 July 2013, www.ft.com). 
89 On the basis of the ECB’s Annual Accounts, the net interest income arising from securities pur-
chased under the SMP amounted to 1,108 million euros for FY 2012, 962 million euros for FY 2013, 728 
million euros for FY 2014. 
90 Besides, just days before the country’s general election, it was revealed that Italy was by far the 
greatest beneficiary of the SMP, with the Eurosystem holding Italian debt securities for a nominal amount 
of 102.8 billion euros. See ECB Press Release, Details on securities holdings acquired under the Securities 
Market Programme, 21 February 2013, www.ecb.europa.eu. For early estimates, see IMF, Euro Area Policies: 
2012 Article IV Consultation - Selected Issues Paper, in IMF Country Report No. 12/182, July 2012, p. 47; Mor-
gan Stanley, Trading After the PSI, 8 March 2012.  
91 Between 2015 and 2037, it was estimated that 20 billion euros of Greek bonds held by the ECB will 
reach maturity. See C. FORELLE, P. MINCZESKI, E. BENTLEY, Greece’s Debt Due: What Greece Owes When, in Wall 
Street Journal, 19 February 2015, graphics.wsj.com.  
92 See for instance D. KEOHANE, A €5bn Greek Bond Imminently Falling Due? Did We Mention We Have 
Deckchairs by This Abyss?, in Financial Times, 9 November 2012, ftalphaville.ft.com. 
93 On the transfer of the Bank of Greece’s SMP income to the Greek State, see the ECB Opinion of 20 
February 2013, CON/2013/15. 
94 See Eurogroup, Statement on Greece, 27 November 2012, www.eurozone.europa.eu. See also ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, December 2012, p. 44. Euro Area Member States receiving financial assistance by the 
EFSF/ESM were exempted from participation in the scheme. 
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transfers would be conducted in a phased manner and “conditional upon a strong im-
plementation by the country of the agreed reform measures in the programme period 
as well as in the post-programme surveillance period”.95 
SMP profits were transferred on a segregated account with the Bank of Greece that 
had to be used exclusively for public debt servicing, subject to prior detailed reporting 
to the EFSF/ESM.96 The account was established by Law 4063/201297 to meet one of the 
second economic adjustment programme requirements.98 Greece had to ensure priori-
ty to debt servicing payments and adopt specific measures to this end. 
Accordingly, Art. 4, para. 5, of Law 4063/2012 (as amended)99 sets forth that the 
service of public debt is a “special goal of public nature” and that it has priority over any 
other expense. “These provisions prove that Greece now has departed from the […] po-
sition adopted by the Greek government in 1938, when it used the doctrine of state of 
necessity to justify its choice of giving preference to meeting its internal vital needs 
(administration, defence, public health, etc.) over paying its debt to its foreign credi-
tors”.100 More radical views questioned this form of conditionality claiming that Greece 
was moving towards “a creditors’ constitution” with the Troika “interfering directly in the 
constitutional set-up of a sovereign State, to impose a duty to pay creditors to take 
precedence over all other human and citizen concerns, needs and rights”.101 
 
95 Ibidem. In parallel, Member States committed to transfer to Greece any future income accruing to 
their national central bank’s holdings of Greek government bonds until 2020. The amounts of the so-
called ANFA payments (Agreement on Net Financial Assets) to be transferred each year, as well as the 
deadline for payment, are established and agreed in the context of the Eurogroup. In principle, they are 
not conditional on the implementation of MoU measures. 
96 Disbursements of EFSF’s loans, as well as the Hellenic Republic’s contributions to debt servicing, 
including all revenues from the privatization of State assets and at least 30 per cent of windfall revenues 
are deposited in the segregated account at the Bank of Greece. 
97 Law 4063/2012 of 30 March 2012 (ΦΕΚ Α’ 71/30-3-2012). The bill also authorized the ratification of 
the ESM and the Fiscal Compact as well as the amendment of Art. 136 TFEU. In Greece, for the implemen-
tation of Euro-crisis law recourse was usually made to ordinary legislation, which does not require a qual-
ified majority vote. In some cases, objections of unconstitutionality were raised. 
98 Pursuant to para. 2.5.6.1 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Con-
ditionality, Greece was required to adopt measures to safeguard debt servicing and monitor cash flows, 
avoid diversion of official financing and secure a timely debt servicing. See Statement by the Eurogroup, 21 
February 2012 and European Commission, The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, in Oc-
casional Papers 94, March 2012, p. 165. See also European Commission, The Second Economic Adjustment 
Programme for Greece: First Review, in Occasional Papers 123, December 2012, p. 203. 
99 Para. 5 of Art. 4 of Law 4063/2012 was amended by Art. 2 of the Presidential legislative act of 18 
July 2015 (ΦΕΚ Α 84/18-7-2015). 
100 D.V. SKIADAS, Tackling Greece’s Financial Crisis: A Legal-Institutional Viewpoint, in K.A. LAVDAS, S.N. 
LITSAS, D.V. SKIADAS, Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum, Lexington Books, 
2013, pp. 83-173, p. 160. 
101 J. SMITH, Greece: Towards a Creditors’ Constitution?, in Socialist Lawyer, July 2012, p. 14. 
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In July 2013, the Eurogroup approved a two billion euros transfer to the segregated 
account and mandated the ESM to make the disbursement in two instalments.102 The 
ESM was involved to avoid claims of breach of Arts 123 and 125 TFEU.103 It is unclear 
though whether these transfers fall within the competence of the mechanism. 
SMP profits came to the forefront again in February 2015, during the frantic negoti-
ations to prolong the second adjustment programme. The Greek Finance Minister Yanis 
Varoufakis requested bridge financing to meet the obligations towards the IMF and the 
ECB, falling due in the following months.104 “We ask the Eurogroup to disburse to 
Greece the outstanding 1.9 billion euros SMP bond-related Eurosystem income, in ac-
cordance with its previous commitments. We are, in fact, open to the idea that the ECB 
transfers these funds directly to the IMF in lieu of Greece outstanding repayments”.105 
The Eurogroup decided, however, that “Only approval of the conclusion of the re-
view of the extended arrangement by the institutions […] will allow for any disburse-
ment of the outstanding tranche of the current EFSF programme and the transfer of the 
2014 SMP profits. Both are […] subject to approval by the Eurogroup”.106 
On 30th June 2015, at the expiry of the programme, Greece was formally declared in 
arrears with the IMF as it was unable to repay 1.5 billion euros.107  
Only on 17th July 2015, with banks still closed and swift legislative steps taken to re-
build trust, the Council decided to grant Greece short-term financial assistance to allow 
it to honour its debt obligations until agreement on a new ESM programme was 
reached.108  
To safeguard non-Euro area members from possible losses deriving from the EFSM 
bridge financing, the Eurogroup decided to deposit, this time on an ECB account, the 
SMP profits accrued in 2014.109 If not needed, allocations would be returned to Euro ar-
ea members. To our knowledge, since then, no other transfer has been made. 
 
102 Eurogroup, Statement on Greece, 8 July 2013, www.eurozone.europa.eu. See also EFSF Press Re-
lease of 31 July 2013 and EFSF Press Release of 17 December 2013, both available at www.efsf.europa.eu. 
103 See Pringle, cit., paras 125-126: “Art. 123 is addressed specifically to the ECB and the central banks 
of the Member States. The grant of financial assistance by one Member State or by a group of Member 
States to another Member State is therefore not covered by that prohibition. […] even if the Member 
States are acting via the ESM, the Member States are not derogating from the prohibition laid down in 
Art. 123 TFEU, since that article is not addressed to them”. On Art. 125 TFEU, see Thomas Pringle, cit., pa-
ras 136-139.  
104 Between February and June 2015, Greece was to reimburse 5.2 billion euros to the IMF and in Ju-
ly/August, it was to repay 6.7 billion euros to the ECB as holder of SMP Greek bonds. 
105 See Y. VAROUFAKIS, Talk in the 11th February 2015 Eurogroup Meeting, www.tovima.gr.  
106 See Eurogroup, Statement on Greece, 20 February 2015, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
107 See IMF Press Release, Statement by the IMF on Greece, 30 June 2015, www.imf.org. Arrears with 
the IMF were cleared on 20 July 2015. 
108 See Eurosummit, Statement, 12 July 2015 and Eurogroup, Statement on Greece, 17 July 2015.  
109 Eurogroup, Statement on Greece, 17 July 2015. 
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While the Troika describes the remittance of SMP profits as “additional financing 
sources”,110 these transfers do not have to be reimbursed. Notably, they were discussed 
at first under the heading Official Sector Involvement.111 Incidentally, it has to be noted 
that SMP profits were only transferred to Greece, while they are being retained in the 
case of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
VII. The shift to explicit conditionality in the Outright Monetary 
Transactions and the Public Sector Purchase programmes 
In August 2012, the ECB announced the new Outright Monetary Transactions pro-
gramme (OMT), under which the application of conditionality was finally made explicit. 
The programme concerns only government bonds issued by Euro area members receiv-
ing financial assistance from the EFSF or the ESM and are subject to full compliance with 
the attached “strict and effective conditionality”.112 
The ECB explained the need for explicit conditionality stating that without domestic 
policy reforms parallel to sovereign bonds purchases, its monetary policy would not be 
effective. In the words of the ECB’s President Mario Draghi: “we should not forget why 
countries have found themselves in a bad equilibrium to start with. And this is because 
of policy mistakes. […] If the central bank were to intervene without any actions on the 
part of governments, without any conditionality, the intervention would not be effective 
and the Bank would lose its independence”.113  
According to the CJEU, the introduction of explicit conditionality in the OMT pro-
gramme is legitimate,114 since it guarantees that OMT purchases, as monetary policy 
 
110 See, for instance, European Commission, The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece: 
Third Review, in Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Occasional Papers 159, July 2013, p. 
49, ec.europa.eu. 
111 See European Commission, The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, cit., p. 27. 
112 The ECB decision establishing the Outright Monetary Transactions programme has not been pub-
lished yet. The technical features of the OMT are described in the ECB Press Release, Technical Features of 
Outright Monetary Transactions, 6 September 2012, www.ecb.europa.eu. See also: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, 
September 2012, pp. 7-11 and ECB, Monthly Bulletin, October 2012, pp. 7-9. On the atypical nature of the 
OMT, see the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón delivered on 14 January 2015, case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v. 
Deutscher Bundestag, paras 82-91.  
113 M. DRAGHI, ECB Press conference, 6 September 2012, available at ecb.europa.eu. See also T. 
BEUKERS, The New ECB and Its Relationship with The Eurozone Member States, cit., p. 1607: “The ECB’s inter-
vention in order to restore the proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism may 
have the effect of buying a Member State time, but the intervention itself cannot solve the underlying 
structural problems. The ECB is only willing to buy this time, if the Member State is willing to deal with the 
problems that have caused the malfunctioning of the mechanism. Conditionality should thus guarantee 
that the exceptional ECB intervention is temporary”. 
114 Cfr. Pringle, cit., and Gauweiler, cit. On the Pringle case see: S. ADAM, F.J. MENA PARRAS, The European 
Stability Mechanism through the Legal Meanderings of the Union’s Constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle, in 
European Law Review, 2013, p. 848 et seq.; G. BECK, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice and the Euro 
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measures, “would not work against the effectiveness of the economic policies followed 
by the member States”.115  
The ECB relies on explicit conditionality to ensure that the implementation of its 
monetary policy measures will prevent Member States from departing from the ad-
justment programmes they have subscribed. In addition, by making OMT purchases 
conditional, an incentive is provided to improve a State’s financial and budgetary situa-
tion.116 
 
Crisis – The Flexibility of the Court’s Cumulative Approach in the Pringle Case, in Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 2013, p. 635 et seq.; V. BORGER, The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in Prin-
gle, in German Law Journal, 2013, p. 113 et seq.; P. CRAIG, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleolo-
gy, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2013, p. 3 et seq.; P. CRAIG, Pringle and the Nature 
of Legal Reasoning, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2014, p. 205 et seq.; B. DE WITTE, 
T. BEUKERS, The Court of Justice Approves the Creation of the European Stability Mechanism Outside the EU Le-
gal Order: Pringle, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p. 805 et seq.; L.M. HINOJOSA MARTÍNEZ, La Compati-
bilidad Del Mecanismo Europeo De Estabilidad Con El Derecho Europeo: Jurisprudencia Para Tiempos De Crisis, 
in D.J. LIÑÁN (ed.), Las Crisis Políticas y Económicas: Nuevos Escenarios Internacionales, Madrid: Tecnos, 2014, 
pp. 212-240; O. PORCHIA, Il ruolo della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea nella governance economica eu-
ropea, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2012, p. 593 et seq.; D. THYM, M. WENDEL, Préserver le respect du droit 
dans la crise; la Cour de justice, le MES et le mythe du déclin de la Communauté de droit (arrêt Pringle), in Ca-
hiers de droit européen, 2012, p. 733 et seq.  
On the Gauweiler case see, in particular, the two special issues of the German Law Journal, n. 2/2014 
and n. 3/2015 and the special issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, n. 1/2016. 
See also: F. BASSAN, Le operazioni non convenzionali della BCE al vaglio della Corte costituzionale tedesca, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2014, p. 361 et seq.; T. BEUKERS, The Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Re-
ference on the OMT Programme: In the ECB We Do Not Trust. What About You?, in German Law Journal, 2014, 
343 et seq.; S. CAFARO, Della legittimità del programma OMT della BCE, per ora… ovvero: le conclusioni 
dell’avvocato generale Cruz Villalón nel caso Gauweiler et alii c. Deutscher Bundestag, in SIDIBlog, 18 January 
2015, www.sidi-isil.org; S. CAFARO, L’azione della BCE nella crisi dell’area dell’euro alla luce del diritto 
dell’Unione europea, in G. ADINOLFI, M. VELLANO (a cura di), La crisi del debito sovrano degli Stati dell’area 
dell’euro. Profili giuridici, Torino: Giappichelli, 2013, pp. 49-68; M. GOLDMANN, Friend or Foe? The German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s Request for a Preliminary Ruling on the ECB’s OMT Program, in SIDIBlog, 19 Feb-
ruary 2014, www.sidiblog.org; M. GOLDMANN, Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the 
Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, in German Law Journal, 2014, p. 265 et seq.; M. IOANNIDIS, How Strict 
is “Strict Conditionality”? The New Eurozone Agreement on Greece, in SIDIBlog, 13 March 2015, www.sidi-
isil.org; A. MIGLIO, Il primo rinvio pregiudiziale del Tribunale costituzionale federale tedesco: dialogo o conflit-
to?, in Osservatorio AIC, September 2014, www.osservatorioaic.it; T. PETCH, The Compatibility of Outright 
Monetary Transactions with EU Law, in Law and Financial Markets Review, 2013, p. 13 et seq.; A. VITERBO, Oh 
My …OMT! Some Thoughts About the German Constitutional Court’s Decision to Refer the Outright Monetary 
Transactions Programme to the Court of Justice of the European Union, in SIDIBlog, 13 February 2014, 
www.sidi-isil.org; M. WENDEL, Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy: The German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2014, p. 263 et seq. 
115 Gauweiler, cit., para. 60; see also ivi, paras 104 and 120. A similar reasoning can be applied to the 
PSPP. 
116 C. ZILIOLI, The ECB’s Powers and Institutional Role in the Financial Crisis: A Confirmation from the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2016, pp. 171-184, 
at 174. 
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Besides, even if necessary, compliance with an EFSF/ESM programme does not au-
tomatically guarantee purchases. In fact, the ECB Governing Council has full discretion 
over the start, continuation or suspension of OMTs.117 
Explicit conditionality also features in the Public Sector Purchase Programme 
(PSPP), introduced by the ECB in May 2015.118 
The PSPP is part of the so-called ‘quantitative easing’ and includes the possibility to 
purchase debt securities issued by any Euro area member, irrespective of its financial 
assistance status. Actually, the PSPP rationale differs from that of the OMTs: while the 
OMT programme aims at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and 
the singleness of the euro monetary policy, the PSPP aims at facilitating credit provision, 
stimulating economic activities and contributing to keep inflation rates close to 2 per 
cent in the whole Euro area. OMTs therefore can be selectively (and proportionately) ap-
plied where necessary. On the contrary, PSPP purchases target the whole Euro area. 
To mitigate potential financial risks, several cumulative safeguards were included in 
the PSPP. Purchases are in fact restricted to debt securities complying with collateral 
eligibility rules (as recently reformed)119 and limits apply to the maximum amount of 
debt securities that the Eurosystem may hold.120 Furthermore, purchases of public sec-
tor assets issued by countries receiving EU/IMF financial assistance are subject to com-
pliance with programme conditionality: “In the event of a review of an ongoing financial 
assistance programme, eligibility for PSPP purchases shall be suspended and shall re-
sume only in the event of a positive outcome of the review”.121  
A “positive outcome of a review” entails the approval of a further disbursement un-
der the financial assistance programme by the ESM Board of Directors and, in case of 
IMF co-financing, approval by the Fund’s Executive Board as well.122 
However, even after the conclusion of a review, purchases of central government 
bonds under the PSPP can be carried out – prudentially – only for a period of two 
months (unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying a suspension or a con-
 
117 ECB Press Release, Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, cit.  
118 Decision ECB/2015/10 of the EBC of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset 
purchase programme. A complaint against the PSPP programme was filed in front of Germany’s Federal 
Constitutional Court soon after; the brief is available in German language at www.jura.uni-freiburg.de. 
119 The new temporary framework for collateral contains an explicit reference to EU/IMF conditionali-
ty. See supra, at the end of para. 1.  
120 The issue limit refers to the maximum share of a single PSPP-eligible security that the Eurosystem 
may hold. The issuer limit refers to the maximum share of an issuer’s outstanding securities that the ECB 
may buy. The issuer limit of 33 per cent is a means to safeguard market functioning and price formation 
as well as to mitigate the risk of the ECB becoming a dominant creditor of Euro Area governments. The 
issuer limit includes/takes into account also bonds purchased under the SMP programme. 
121 Art. 3, para. 2, let. d), of the PSPP Decision.  
122 Art. 2 of the PSPP Decision. 
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tinuation of purchases).123 It is in the ECB Governing Council’s discretional powers to 
determine whether such circumstances exist.  
In the context of the PSPP, therefore, explicit conditionality serves the purpose of 
ensuring that purchases are proportionate to the monetary policy aims pursued by the 
programme and that the related financial risks are reduced through adequate risk 
management measures.  
It is revealing that, as a result of the risk-limitation measures put in place, no purchas-
es of Greek sovereign bonds were undertaken under the PSPP up to the time of writ-
ing.124  
VIII. Conclusions 
During the crisis, to safeguard the EMU and its stability, the ECB deployed all its mone-
tary policy instruments, prompting Member States to adopt urgent and crucial reforms 
(sometimes even driving them to seek EU/IMF financial assistance) or pushing pro-
gramme countries to comply with the Troika’s conditionality. 
As the survival of the EMU was the ECB’s ultimate goal, it can be argued that its ac-
tions were justified, even if many issues are being raised not only from a purely legal 
perspective. 
To assess whether the ECB acted within the scope of its mandate, although close to 
the edge, an analysis of ECB’s policy instruments was performed, keeping implicit and 
explicit conditionality separate. 
Decisions on collateral eligibility were taken by the ECB in the exercise of its power to 
limit the assumption of risks for the Eurosystem. As such, the ECB Governing Council con-
sidered compliance with EU/IMF conditionality relevant to assess the adequacy as collat-
eral of sovereign bonds issued by Euro area countries in distress. However, even if collat-
eral decisions can be considered a legitimate exercise of discretionary power, it may be 
argued that the latter was stretched to the point of becoming a true political action. 
A similar reasoning applies in the case of ELA. The ECB Governing Council may pru-
dentially establish ceilings on ELA whenever the assistance is deemed to interfere with 
the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem. However, confidential letters, threatening 
caps on ELA unless financial assistance is requested and structural reforms are imple-
mented, seem to depart from the institutional role of a central bank.  
 
123 Art. 4, para. 2, of the PSPP Decision.  
124 In June 2016, the ECB Governing Council declared that it will examine the possibility of future pur-
chases of Greek government bonds under the PSPP “taking into account the progress made in the analy-
sis and reinforcement of Greece’s debt sustainability, as well as other risk management considerations” 
(see ECB Press Release, ECB Reinstates Waiver Affecting the Eligibility of Greek Bonds Used as Collateral in Eu-
rosystem Monetary Policy Operations, 22 June 2016). 
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For what concerns the SMP, although no reference to conditionality was contained 
in the relevant legal framework, sovereign bond purchases were conditioned to the 
timely adoption of economic, fiscal and structural reforms by the country issuing the 
bonds. In this context, therefore, one might regard the use of confidential letters to put 
pressure on the governments of Italy and Spain as an alarming signal. 
In the light of the above, the introduction of explicit conditionality in the decisions 
introducing the OMT and PSPP programme can be considered a turning point. Compli-
ance with programme conditionality became one of the eligibility requirements for the 
purchases of sovereign bonds issued by crisis countries. The new approach contributed 
to enhance legal certainty and predictability. 
Notably, in the Gauweiler decision, the European Court of Justice found the inclusion 
of explicit conditionality in the OMT programme legitimate.125  
Nevertheless, many pointed out that the CJEU showed a high degree of deference 
towards the ECB, leaving enormous discretion to the European monetary authority. 
Remarkably, despite the different view expressed by Advocate General Cruz Villalón, the 
CJEU refrained from scrutinizing the ECB’s activity within the Troika.126  
The issue deserves careful consideration: on the European political arena, the ECB 
plays a dual role, at the same time acting as a member of the group of institutions nego-
tiating financial adjustment packages and as an enforcer of conditionality.127 
On the one side, it has been argued that the ECB only provides advice and exper-
tise, in line with the tasks conferred upon it by the EU Treaties and the ESCB Statute.128 
 
125 See Gauweiler, cit., para. 60. 
126 See Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, Gauweiler, cit., para. 145: “Unilaterally making the purchase of 
government bonds subject to compliance with conditions when those conditions have been set by a third 
party is not the same as doing so when the ‘third party’ is not really a third party. In those circumstances, 
the purchase of debt securities subject to conditions may become another instrument for enforcing the 
conditions of the financial assistance programmes. The mere fact that the purchase may be perceived in 
that way — as an instrument which serves macroeconomic conditionality — may be sufficient in its im-
pact to detract from or even distort the monetary policy objectives that the OMT programme pursues”. 
127 On the ECB’s role within the Troika see D. SARMIENTO, The advocate General’s Opinion and the 
Judgement in the Gauweiler Case, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2016, pp. 40-54, at 
52-53; T. TRIDIMAS, N. XANTHOULIS, A Legal Analysis of the Gauweiler Case: Between Monetary Policy and Consti-
tutional Conflict, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2016, pp. 17-39, at 34. See also the 
European Parliament Resolution P7_TA(2014)0239 of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and op-
erations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries, in 
particular para. 54. The European Parliament pointed to the potential conflict of interest between the role 
of the ECB within the Troika as “technical advisor” and as ‘enforcer of conditionality’ exerting pressure on 
programme countries through purchases of their sovereign bonds. 
Benoît Coeuré, Member of the ECB Executive Board, underlined that under the difficult circumstanc-
es that led to the establishment of the Troika, the ECB’s particular expertise and Euro Area focus were 
compelling reasons for requesting its participation in the Troika. See B. COEURÉ, Introductory Remarks: Ex-
change of Views of Benoît Coeuré with ECON on Troika Matters, 13 February 2014, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
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Support to this point of view can be found in the relevant legal framework.  
Art. 13 of the ESM Treaty entrusts the European Commission, “in liaison with” the 
ECB, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU is 
signed by the Commission “on behalf of the ESM” and “subject to approval by the ESM 
Board of Governors” (that is the Finance Ministers of the Euro area). It follows that the 
MoU solely originates from and commits the ESM.129 Art. 2, para. 1, let. a), of the EFSF 
Framework Agreement (a private law instrument) and Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the Euro area experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability contain 
similar provisions.130  
However, even if formally it does not participate in the decision-making concerning 
adjustment programmes, “the ECB has been very much part of the decision-shaping 
process”.131 
On the other side, the ECB’s conditionality is regarded by some as a true political ac-
tion departing from the standards of neutrality and independence that central banks 
should meet. 
Beyond this, it was argued that, with the Gauweiler decision, the CJEU supported 
“the establishment of a technocratic regime with unlimited discretionary powers and 
without credible accountability”.132 
It is the contention of this paper that, to address these concerns, the ECB should 
limit itself to provide technical assistance and advice, avoiding any involvement in the 
design and monitoring of future adjustment programmes. Only in this way we would 
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‘troika’ (Commission, ECB and the IMF) actions in euro area programme countries, www.europarl.europa.eu. 
129 The CJEU expressed this position in Thomas Pringle, cit., para. 161 et seq. See also Tribunal, order 
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Opinion of AG Wahl delivered on 21 April 2016, joined cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P, Ledra Ad-
vertising Ltd et al. v. European Commission and ECB, para. 50 et seq. 
130 The same applies under the European Financial Stability Mechanism, through which the EU pro-
vides financial assistance also to non-euro area members. Pursuant to Art. 3, para. 3, of Council Regula-
tion (EU) 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, general 
economic policy conditions are defined by the Commission “in consultation with the ECB”. 
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124, December 2015. 
132 C. JOERGES, A Disintegration of European Studies?, in European Papers, 2016, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 9. See also C. JOERGES, Pereat Iustitia, Fiat Mundus: What is Left of the Europe-
an Economic Constitution after the Gauweiler Litigation?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 2016, pp. 99-118. 
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reach a balance between the ECB’s democratic accountability and its technocratic ex-
pertise, while ensuring the Euro area financial stability. 
 
